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This paper provides a formal model of technol-
ogy choice by a single region. Case studies have
indicated that the technology acquired by LDCs
often seem unsuitable, although the criteria for
suitability are often unclear. The reasons
which are presented for inappropriateness of the
selection often rely more on political arguments
then economic ones, or treat the recipient coun-
try as a passive actor in the whole process.
Can a technology actively selected by a recip-
ient country ever by inappropriate, assuming
factor cost ratios represent true relative values?
A model presented by Evenson and Bingswanger
(1978) indicates that a technology developed in
one economic or physical environment may be
'appropriate' to a second, very different envir-
onment if the second environment can generate a
very limited range of technological possibilities
on its own. Ranis (1978) has emphasized the im-
portance of information on technological alter-
natives flowing smoothly and accurately within
the system and the need to acquire capacity for
adaptive research. Both these approaches recog-
nize the importance of indigenous research
capacity, although Ranis accords more emphasis
to friction and proper incentives within the
system. Barring policy and management problems,
their conclusions appear to be that technology
choice will be efficient--the appearance of in-
appropriateness stems from the lack of explicit
recognition of the contraints on technology
generation in the system.
The model presented below builds on the early
models of rational technology selection of Even-
son-Binswanger and Ranis. It shares common ele-
ments with the Evenson-Binswanger model and may
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be regarded as a generalization of their model.
It goes further, however, in several crucial as-
pects. It allows the extent of both adaptive
and independent research to be choice variables
in the technology acquisition decision. It
allows for selection out of a continuum of tech-
nologies which differ in the environments for
which they were designed. It allows for limits
to the extent to which technologies can be
adapted across environments and allows for
losses because of imcomplete adaption. The
public goodnature of research plays a critical
role in determining the efficiency of resource
allocation as well.
The model presented immediately below is
couched in terms relating to agricultural tech-
nology. A reason for first presenting a model
of agricultural technology selection is that
many of the conceptual issues possess more in-
tuitive natural interpretations. A second
section will consider the impact of market
structure on the development of technology, and
a third section will broaden the basic model of
agricultural technology development to one which
emcompasses certain types of fixed capital in-
vestment. A fourth section discusses testing of
the model.
Technology Choice in Agriculture
In the model below, the decision is made by
a region as to whether to adopt technology pro-
duced in other regions or build up a stock of
indigenously developed technology. The region
assumes that its research policies will not af-
fect those of any other region. In practice,
especially internationally, such behavior seems
the rule rather than the exception. The focus is
the consideration which enter into the technology
acquisition decision for a single country, not
efficiency in resource allocation among a set of
countries.** In discussing the transferability of
technology, we can use the environmental-sensi-
, tivity measure devised by Evenson and Binswanger,
which relates cost of production with a given
technology in its native environment to cost of
production in another environment in which it is
used. The meaning of the term "environment" is
also clear. In the agricultural context,If a technology developed in environment j is
The availability of research across all other
environments is expressed by
The extent to which research can be trans-
ferred from environment j to environment k is
determined by
Let Ei represent the i'th environment and de-
note the domestic environment by ED' Also
define Eki = Ek - Ei as the distance between the
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i.e., as a function of the distance between the
original environment to which the research was
tailored and the environment to which it is
being adapted. The extent of transferability is
assumed to decline at an increasing rate as the
distance between the original environment and the
target environment increases. Thus, tjfXj
measures the total technology transferable from
environment j to environment f.
where Ef is the environment to which the tech-
nology is adapted, and EfD' therefore represents
the extent to which the domestic region has com-
promised in tailoring the technology to its
environment. The less the technology stock is
tailored to the domestic environment, the lower
the value of the stock. It is also assumed that
the decline in the usefulness of the technology
becomes steeper as it is less adapted. Below,
when we discuss the degree of adaptation of a
technology, we will be referring to the value of
afD'
The cost of incompletely adapting a stock of
research available from a distant environment is
the sacrifice of some environmental specificity
of research. As a region compromises on the ex-
tent to which it adapts technologies to its re-
gion, it is likely to be lowering the usefulness
of the technology which it has acquired. An
illustration can be drawn from the water avail-
ability example discussed above. If traditional
technologies are drought resistant but the newly
acquired technology is not as resistant, the
effectiveness of the acquired technology stock
will be diminished by the extent of the added
losses from drought. The reduction in research
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where j ranges over the extent of the environ-
mental index. It will be assumed that there are
increasing amounts of research available with
greater environmental distance from the domestic
region, but that the rate of increase is falling.
In making the decisions discussed above, the
availability of research resources for adaptive
and independent research must also be considered.
If there are large numbers of well-trained re-
searchers willing and able to create technologies
specific to their environment, the technology
acquired by the region, both adapted and created
indigenously, will be closely tailored to the
domestic environment. If such capacity is ab-
sent, there will be less concern about the com-
pleteness of adaptation since the role of inde-
pendent research will be less significant rela-
tive to the research imported.
On the other hand, it may remain advantageous
to sacrifice a degree of drought resistance in
order to acquire a technology which is better in
other ways. However, the impact of a diminish-
ment in the level of drought resistance on the
advantages of technology superior in other
dimensions must be considered. As an imported
technology becomes more susceptible to drought,
the benefits from improvements in other dimen-
sions will be reduced according to the increase
in damage from drought.
climatic differences will produce differing iso-
quants a 1a Riccardo, and the environmental sen-
sitivity will depend on these differences.
A number of factors will determine its deci-
sion. The first is the distribution of research
which is available from regions under differing
water regimes. Irrigated and well-watered regions
may have a preponderance of the available re-
search and the technologies developed in these
regions may have very desirable characteristics.
However, the difficulty in incorporating resis-
tance to severe drought conditions into these
technologies may commend adapting a smaller re-
search stock available from a region in which
drought resistance is a greater priority.
Assume that research has been successfully
conducted on varieties grown under various re-
gimes of water availability. A country in which
drought is a problem most of the time is attempt-
ing to choose its research priorities. It has a
traditional agricultural technology which is very
resilient under drought conditions but which is
lacking in other dimensions. The choices avail-
able to the country are (a) ignore the research
of the other regions and conduct research inde-
pendently according to its own priorities and
abilities and (b) adapt the research of other
regions to the domestic conditions of drought.
For the concreteness it will be assumed that
water control is the relevant environmental
dimension, that environments range from desert to
well irrigated, and that the percent of seasons
without drought problems measures water control.
Any relevant environmental dimension or an index
combining several dimensions could serve as well.
84adapted to environment k, the amount available
to the domestic environment D, will be
where
It would also be possible to write the trans-
ferred research component as
(l_e-TfjXl ) x.
J , "
where Tfj = T(Efj)T < 0 T < O.
In the argument for g C.), the research bene-
fits function, the term in square brackets re-
presents a stock of research which the domestic
region is attempting to utilize and the factor
afD discounts this technology by the extent to
which it is not adapted to the domestic region.
There is little qualitative difference in the re-
sults obtained using either form. The second
form allows the adaptation of any technology to
any environment as long as more adaptive research
is performed. The earlier form is more amenable
to graphical interpretation and is used in the
presentation below.
is the research benefits function,
is the cost function of the two
research types,
is the level of adaptive research
conducted by the domestic region
acquiring research,
is the level of the independent re-
search activity in the domestic
region,
is, as discussed above, the relative
effectiveness of research, which
depends on the degree to which the
transferred research has been adapt-
ed to the domestic environment,
is the research available in region
j,
is a parameter which determines the






For simplicity, much separability has been
incorporated into the functional forms. Thus,
Xj is the transferable research of region j,
tfjX, is the maximum potential transfer of re-
sear~h from environment j to environment f, and
(l-e-PXl) measures the percentage of the maximum
potential transfer which is actually transferred.
The point of this formulation is to introduce
the effort directed at research transfer, the
extent of adaptation and the distribution of
potentially transferable research of factors in
the determination of appropriate technology for
the region.
It is assumed that the orientation of independ-
ent domestic research is determined in conjunctlin
with the decisions on the transfer of technology,
and that the two complement each other. The
former, however, is constrained by the degree of
adaptability which has been built into technology
acquired from other regions and will decline in
usefulness the less the technology as a whole is
adapted to the domestic region. In the example
in which water availability is the relevant en-
vironmental index, if transferred technology has
not been rendered adequately drought resistant
by adaptive research, the effectiveness of tech-
nology developed domestically will suffer to the
same extent. This is equivalent to the assump-
tion that technologies combined from different
sources will jointly have the minimum of their
levels of adaptability. In this case, domestic
research may be assumed adapted to the domestic
environment but limited by the adaptability built
into the transferred research. This is probably
a conservative assumption. Many of the results
will hold qualitatively even with more liberal
assumption on the joint adaptability of technol-
ogies acquired from diverse sources.
The four decision variables are (1) the envi-
ronment whose technology is to be transferred,
Ej; (2) the extent to which the technology is to
be adapted to the conditions of the domestic
regions, EDf; (3) the level of adaptive research,
Xl; and (4) the level of research aimed at im-
proving upon the acquired technology, X2. If
there is no attempt at transferring research,
then only independent research, directed at im-
proving existing technology in the domestic re-
gion, is conducted.
afDtj fXj
Implicitly, this scheme disaggregates a tech-
nology package into two components. One compon-
ent consists of characteristics of the technology
which are relatively insensitive to environmental
changes. The environmental sensitivity of any
element in the technology package will be deter-
mined specifically for each region seeking to
acquire technology, and will vary between re-
gions. It is on the environmental-sensitive
elements that adaptive research is conducted, and
the degree to which the sensitivity is eliminated
determines the extent of adaptability to the do-
mestic region.






The equilibrium conditions are presented be-
low. £ (.) refers to the elasticity of • with
respect to its argument and nt is the percentage




In Figure 2, equilibrium values of £(Xjt)/EDj
and £(a)/EfD are drawn. From (8) the increase
of the slope of thr ray drawn from the origin to
any point along BB can be seen to be the share
of transferred technology in the total technology
The conditions above are conditions for an in-
terior solution. Examination of the nature of
corner solutions provides some insight into con-
ditions which will make a region rely entirely
on transferred research or its own research. In
(5), since nt is bounded by one, if
then transferred technology is adapted completely
to the domestic environment (or no transfer is






then the original environment of the transferred
technology will be the one which has conducted
the most research.
By taking the differentials of (5) and (8),
it is possible to examine the effects of shifts
in the underlying parameters. It is possible to
show that a positive shift in the marginal cost
of adaptive research will induce less adaptive
research on but a greater degree of adaptation
of a technology drawn from a nearer environment.
The level of independent research will increase.
On the other hand, an upward shift in the margin-
al cost of independent research will induce a
lower level of independent research, a higher
level of adaptive research, less adaptation to
the domestic environment, and selection of a
technology from a more distant environment. The
negatively correlated movements of the level of
adaptive research, Xl' and the extent of adap-
tation, afD, occur because the value of the lat-
ter depends heavily on the relative importance
of independent and adaptive research. As inde-
pendent domestic research gains more prominence,
the extent to which a technology will be adapted
to the domestic environment increases.
g = zo. 0 < 0. <I, where Z is the amount of
technology acquired, fulfill the condition.
Similar conditions and results emerge from an
outward shift of the stock of research in other
regions.
,
where, as before, £ (g) is the elasticity of
marginal benefits and nt is the share of trans-
ferred technology in the total of technology
acquired. The intuitive explanation of this
condition is that if marginal benefits fall very
quickly, easier access to research performed by
other regions may induce a cutback in the level
of adaptive research. All benefits functions
of the form
,
-£ (g ) /
If other regions increase the transferability
of their research, shifting the t schedule up-
wards and raising the maximum potential trans-
ferability from other environments, the effects
will generally be similar to those resulting
from a lowering of marginal costs of adaptive
research. The exact sufficiency condition for
these results is that
stock acquired by the region. This obviously
precludes combinations below the 45-degree line
in Figure 2, because the implied share of trans-
ferred technology would be greater than one. It
also indicates that the degree of adaptation to
the domestic environment will diminish as the
importance of transferred technology increases.
Factors which could accomplish this would include
reductions in the relative cost of adaptive re-
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Figures I and 2 analyze some implications of
these equilibrium conditions. The first quadrant
of figure 1 illustrates (6). The values of £(X.)
and -£(t) are graphed against Efj and EOj' ]
From (6) locis of points of equilibrium are the
points £(t) and ~Xj) which lie on the same ray
drawn from the origin. FOt example, as th~ ray
OR indicates, when EOj = EOj' then Efj = Efj'
The former, EOj ' is the distance of the domestic
environment from the environment of origin of the
new technology, and Efj is the extent to which
the technology has been adapted to the domestic
environment. The distance between the equilibrium
points is EfO, the measure of the extent to which
the borrowed technology has not been adapted to
the domestic environment. The point S indicates
the point where the transferred technology is
completely adapted to the domestic environment.
In quadrant IV, the equilibrium values of EfO and
Efj are graphed. In quadrant III, -£(a) is
graphed against EfD. In quadrant II, the equil,
ibrium values of -£(t) and (a) are shown as PP











A shift in the afD schedule produces ambig-
uous effects. The interpretation of proportion-
ate outward shift would be that the decline in
the effectiveness of a fixed research stock as
it becomes less adapted to the domestic environ-
ment becomes less severe. It is clear that the
marginal productivity of both adaptive and inde-
pendent research would increase, holding the
other two choice variables fixed. It can also
be shown that if the relative share of independ-
ent research decreases, then so will the equil-
ibrium value of £(Xj), corresponding to an in-
creased dependence on technology developed in a
more distant environment. If the share of trans-
ferred research increases, then the value of
£(a)/EfD must fall. The direction in which
shares move would seem to depend on whether the
cost of independent research increases quickly
relative to the cost and availability of trans-
ferred research.
The assumptions of negative second deriva-
tives for the a(EfD), t(Efj) and Xj(EDj ) func-
tions made interior solutions more likely. The
interpretations of these assumptions are
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(1) the marginal losses due to nonadaptation are
increasing, (2) the marginal ability to adapt
diminishes more rapidly the greater the distance
over which adaptation is attempted, and (3) the
marginal increase in technology as one moves to
more distant environments is diminishing.
Altering the third of these assumptions to
allow for increasing marginal research availa-
bility with greater distance could introduce
increasing returns to scale so that a region's
choice would be between adapting a larger but
distant stock or not doing any adaptive re-
search at all, eliminating intermediate choices.
This could also be regarded as the Evenson-
Binswanger case with discrete rather than con-
tinuous technology choice sets.
Some effects of altering the first two
assumptions are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
The effect of changing the second assumption is
indicated by the solid lines, while the effect
of altering the first is illustrated by the
dashed lines and tildas. The most striking























equilibrium relationship of EDj and EDf does not
hold. Both extremely high and extremely low
levels of research transfer will be associated
with high degree of adaptation. Figure 4 ex-
presses this somewhat differently, indicating
that the relative importance of transferred re-
search can be associated with two different
levels of adaptability. The case illustrated by
the solid lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4 can be
interpreted as indicating that for any value of
afD there will be two values of E(X) and E(t)
which fulfill the equilibrium conditions, one
which a large share of a small research stock may
be transferred and a second in which a smaller
share of a larger stock is available. Of these
two values, one will provide a greater borrowable
stock of research than will the other. For any
value of afD, there will be only one efficient
borrowable stock although the function relating
equilibrium values of E(a) and E(Xj) need not be
continuous. From Figure 4 it can be seen that
of the possible equilibrium associated with any
value of E(a), one will have a relatively greater
emphasis on transfer and will have a more distant
origin for the transferred technology than will
the other possible equlilbrium. As would be ex-
pected, such a system would tend to show much
less regular responses to parameter shifts. In
the case devoted in Figure 3 and Figure 4 by
dashed lines and tildas, both t f · and aDf fall at
a slower rate with higher valuesJof their argu-
ments. This case poses more complications than
the one just discussed as there are likely to be
potential equilibria at various combinations of
extreme values of tfj and aDf'
Market Structure and Technology Choice
This section will consider the effect of
market size on the amount and type of research
which will be conducted. It is clear that the
benefits of a new technology will be a positive
function of the scale on which it is utilized.
If the region acquiring new technology is small
and homogeneous, facing elastic input supplies,
it will be reasonable to associate increases in
market size with outward shifts in the marginal
benefits function of research. The focus of this
section will be the expansion path of transferred
and independent domestic research as the marginal
benefits function is shifted outwards. The re-
lated, but not identical, question of how the
composition of the research bundle will change
as marginal costs change will also be examined.
The latter issue can be related to the public
good aspect of research. Although a particular
region in a given environment may be interested
only in its own benefits, the other regions
which share the environment may come to recognize
that, taken as a group, their access to research
resources of mutual benefits is significantly
greater than the availability of resources as
perceived by each individually. The ability to
benefit from the research of others may be
regarded as lowering the cost of acquiring any
level of research, assuming that the regions act
in concert in acquiring the research.
Some of the earlier discussion is relevant to
these problems. It was noted above that as the
share of transferred technology increased, there
would be a tendency to acquire technology from
more distant environments but with less adapta-
tion to the domestic environment. As well, there
was a limit to the amount of research which was
available for transfer from other environments,
a limit which could stem from increasing
89difficulties in adapting research from distant
environments as well as actual limits to the
amount of technology developed at those environ-
ments. The total of technology which becomes
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and afD' tfj, Xj' Xl and Xz are as defined above.
Where no confuslon will arise, the subscripts
will be dropped in the future.
when technology is acquired through additional
adaptive research, and
dC dXZ




From the earlier discussion, it is known that
the equilibrium values of a, t, and Xj are
linked, as was illustrated in Figure 1. In fact,
if we define
T* = a* t*X *
j
when technology is acquired through domestic re-
search. The equilibrium condition for an inter-
ior solution required that the marginal cost of
additional technology be the same, whether ac-
quired domestically or through transfer. Thus,
where, as before,
the actual amount of technology transfer, and
and Ef measures the extent to which technology is
adapted to the region.
C'ePXl C'
I Z
* ," pT a
whereas the marginal cost of domestic research
is constant, once the level of a* (and therefore,
t*, Xj*, T*, etc.) is fixed, the marginal cost
of transfered research increases exponentially.
Figure 5 shows the marginal costs of different
levels of transferred and domestic research. It
is clear that if the total amount of technology
which is required is less than ZO, transfered re-
search will be relied upon to provide all of the
technology. Any technology beyond Zo will be
acquired domestically. For example, if Z is re-
quired Zo will be transfered and (Zl - ZO) ~ro­
vided from domestic sources. Because of thls,
the curve 0 B C is the marginal cost of research
as a whole, and one could erase the portion of
MCT above B and the portion AB of MCD and con-
sider the remaining curve 0 B C alone.
It will be recalled that the above discussion
had fixed the level of a* and, thereby, of T*.
From the expression for the marginal cost of re-
search acquired via transfer it can be seen that
as T* increases (and a* falls) the marginal cost
of transfered research will also fall. From the
expression for the marginal cost of research
acquired domestically, it is clear that the mar-
ginal cost of research acquired domestically
rises as a* falls. From the relationship be-
tween T* and a*, it is clear that T* rises more
slowly with successive decrements to the value
of a*. These relationships are incorporated
into Figure 6, which graphs the marginal cost
functions at various levels of a*.
Z
-pX





where the asterisks denote equilibrium values,
it is easy to show that
X'
(1 - 11) t dEf
j
It is also possible to show that in equili-
brium the values of t and 11 increase with Xj
while that of a declines. An increase in Ef low-
ers the value of a, but raises the equilibrium
value of T*. We can also define
-PX
l T :: T* (l-e )
the level of independent domestic research
diminished by the extent to which the technology
as a whole is not adapted to the environment.
As Ef increases, -alia is also increasing and
Xj/Xj is falling. The additional amounts of
technology which become available with successive
diminishments in the standards of adaptation be-
become lower and ultimately are zero.
We may rewrite Z, holding T* fixed, as
-pX
Z = T*(l-e 1) + D
and compare the marginal costs of acquiring
additional technology via transfer or domestic
research. The marginal cost of research is
Note that ao al aZ a3. The figure illus-
trates a tradeoff between the cost and potential
of transfering research and the cost of domestic
research. If g1 is introduced as the marg~nal
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and that different totals of




* each value of a ,
technology will be
of a*. The maximi-
technology generation.
Second, as the marginal benefits function
shifts outward, there will be a tendency to rely
more upon domestic research and less upon
transferred research. This was illustrated by
the choice of a higher value of a as the margin-
al benefits shifted from g~ to gZ'
From the drawing, it is clear that if we re-
strict the available values of a to the four
presented, the intersection of MC3 and g~ pre-
sents the greatest net benefit level.
If marginal benefits shift out to gi, similar
ipspection will show the intersection of MCO and
gz as providing the most benefits. When gJ is
the marginal benefits curve, the preferred value
of a is not clear, although the intersection of
MCl or MCZ and g~ appear most likely. With g~ as
the benefits curve, the intersection with MCO
appears to be the optimal point.
Several generalizations emerge. First, when
marginal benefits ~re relatively low and falling
rapidly, as with gl' there will be a greater
dependence on transferred research and a greater
possibility of a corner solution in which all
research is acquired through transfer. If this
corner solution does emerge, then the optimal
value of a will be that which is consistent with
the maximum potential transfer, which will be
lower than any value consistent with domestic
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Thirdly, as the marginal benefits function
becomes more elastic, even at low marginal
benefit levels as provided by g~, there will be
a greater tendency to rely on domestic research.
These generalizations suggest that as markets
expand, there will be a tendency to shift from
a pattern of reliance on adapted foreign re-
search to research conducted locally and aimed
specifically at the region. In fact, over time
a region which initially adapted the technology
of another region may corne to be the primary
source of new technology, the original source of
new technology reverting to the role of adapter.
Evenson has reported on shifts of the locus of
inventive activity as measured by patenting of
agricultural machinery in different regions of
the United States at different times. These
shifts appear to behave in rough conconcordance
with the predictions of this model.
One might suspect that size of market is it-
self endogenous, depending on the success of the
research venture at least to some extent. SuchFigure 6.
Me
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interdependence is difficult to introduce into
this type of model. One can envision a richer
technology cycle model consisting of the follow-
ing four stages. Evenson and Binswanger, have
also outlined a technology development cycle.
The first stage would be direct transfer of
technology into a different environment. This
transfer may be a co~ercia1 experiment Or a pro-
tected 'hothouse' endeavor.
In the second stage, various adaptive efforts
would be incorporated into the technology.
The third stage would consist of evaluating
the potential of the technology for further im-
provement. In many cases, this would amount to
deciding whether the technology was competitive
in world markets or could be with more research.





whether the technology is competitive in long-
run Hecksher-Ohlin terms. One can imagine that
there exists a variety of long-run isoquant maps
corresponding to various allocations of engin-
eering and scientific resources. It is on the
basis of these isoquant maps that the third
stage decisions would be made.
In effect, the third stage would predict the
scale at which improvements are to be evaluated.
Anticipation of great success would increase the
scale and, as shown before, lead to a greater
emphasis of independent techpo10gy development.
The fourth stage implements the third stage
decision. If the current or potential technolo-
gy is found to be competitive, additional re-
sources will be expended on the technology with
a high likelihood that there will be a greater
dependence on domestically produced, specificInvestment in Research and Physical Capital
The maximization problem of the first section
can now be rewritten as
(2) + max
Two polar cases will be of interest. The
first case we will examine is one in which it is
easier to irrigate a smaller percentage of a
region's area to a large extent than to irrigate
a larger fraction of the area to a lesser degree.
Certain dam projects which benefit relatively
small areas would fall into this category. More
generally, if there are high fixed costs to in-
troducing irrigation, there will be an incentive
to limit the area of irrigation. For the sake
of simplicity, it will be assumed that an irri-
gated region will have free access to all of the
technology created elsewhere for irrigated
regions.
The assumption of a fixed, unchangeable do-
mestic environment may be too restrictive.
There are possibilities for changing an environ-
ment, investment in irrigation being an obvious
example, although there are others. If this is
the case, the problem should be restated to
allow for the addition of the domestic environ-
ment as a choice variable.
This reasoning provides a justification for
the establishment of international cente:rs
which does not rely on increasing returns to
scale in a research. It is difficult to measure
the range over which increasing returns exist,
although plausible reasons have been suggested
to support their existence.
through creation of a technology pole which
would raise the amounts of technology available
in more similar environments.
The results suggest that establishment of re-
gional research centers, which pool the resourCffi
of countries in similar environments, may be the
best policy. It also suggests that centers
which focus on many crops for a single environ-
mental niche may be better than centers which
focus on a single crop for many environments
(although one ought to recognize that the niches
will generally differ from crop to crop). Cer-
tainly, they seem to imply that while efficiency
gains may be achieved by initially providing a
stimulus to development of indigenously oriented
research, beyond some point one ought to expect
national programs to carryon the bulk of re-
search. The long-run strategy would best con-
sist of improving the research capacity of
national systems and establishing research
centers in environments possessing low stocks of
research tailored to their needs.
This would suggest that if there are many
little countries clustered in the same environ-
ment, lack of coordination in their research
programs may encourage a greater dependence on
adaptive research than would be efficient. Al-
though the best solution would appear to be an
increase in cooperation and information flows,
this may be difficult to achieve in practice.
A second best solution might be a "forced" in-
crease in the amount of technology directed at
the environment via establishment of an inter-
national center. This increase would encourage
independent research in those environments
where
technology. If not, however, there may emerge a
program restricted to adaptive research or even
a return to, more or less, direct transfer. The
world seems littered with debris from industrial
and agricultural projects which, proving unviable
in competitive markets, produce for a domestic
market, and display little or no productivity
growth over time. On the other hand, the emerg-
ing success in certain activities, leather and
textiles especially, indicates that the transi-
tion to the dynamic fourth stage can be accom-
plished.
The elasticity of marginal benefits enters
into the condition because highly elastic margin-
al benefits favor domestic research, for the
reasons discussed above. In general the condi-
tion would seem to be fulfilled.
(epXl - 1) > (a - 1) t, (g )
As mentioned before, the recognition of mutual
availability and usefulness of research by
countries in the same environment can be regarded
as lowering research costs. As a benchmark case,
the effects of a simultaneous reduction in the
costs of adaptive and independent research will
be considered. In general, the result is
similar to that of an outward shift of the mar-
ginal benefits function. However, there is a
condition which must be fulfilled,
a = Ci/Ci
,
and t, (g ) is the elasticity of the marginal
benefits curve. The intuitive explanation is
that the marginal cost of acquiring additional
technology varies inversely with the degree of
adaptation to the domestic environment. As the
cost of domestic research rises relative to the
cost of adaptive research, there will be a
greater tendency to use adaptive research so that
a large percentage of potentially transferable
technology will be acquired. However, this
limits the potential for further acquisition via
adaptation with price declines, so high values of
Ci/Ci will encourage more use of domestic re-
search with price declines.
93where a is the fraction of land irrigated, a0 CI
is the cost of introducing irrigation to percent
of the region, e is a scale parameter, 0 >1, re-
flecting increasing marginal costs to irrigating
a larger percentage of a region, gl(XI) are the
benefits accruing to an irrigated piece of land
max g
where C2 (EDh) is the cost of shifting the domes-
tic environment to environment h through irriga-
tion.
where Z as always is the total of acquired tech-
nology (the argument of the g(.) function) and
The equilibrium conditions are similar to
~hose which emerged earlier in equations (5) -
(8)
The equilibrium conditions in (12) - (14)
differ from those of (5) - (8) only in the last
equality of (12). The interpretation is
straightforward. The last inequality serves to
set the marginal value of the easier adaptation
of irrigated technologies equal to the marginal
cost of more extensive irrigation. The benefit
obtained from irrigation in this model is that
it brings the domestic environment closer to
those environments in which most of the technolo-
gy has been developed resulting in greater ease
of adaptation of research. Looked at a little
differently, it serves to allow the region to
avoid difficult problems which have not been
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In general, the capital investment in irriga-
tion facilities and the investment in research
appear to be substitutes, the investment in
irrigation inducing a lower demand for research.
One could construct isobenefit curves with in-
vestment in irrigation on one axis and research
investment on the second. Convexity of these
curves guarantees a unique equilibrium. The
equilibrium which would emerge will depend on
the relative prices of irrigation and the two
research activities and would be effected by
shifts in these prices. One interesting possi-
bility is that irrigation may be the preferred
investment if labor costs are low and if there
is an efficient, labor-intensive construction
technique. It would be especially attractive
if the laborers were drawn from a pool of un-
employed or underemployed workers. Hayami has
suggested that such considerations played a
role in the development of the Japanese irriga-
tion network.
In (II), however, the value of go dependes on
the level of (Z), and lower values of go induce
higher values of Z. Whether the maximization
problem presented has an interior solution will
depend on whether or not the costs of extending
irrigation rise faster than the marginal benefit
to research falls. Otherwise the solution may be
complete irrigation of the region or none.
If we allow the subscript k to denote the ex-
tent of irrigation introduced, the maximization
problem may be written as
If we choose a value for a, say a', the rest
of the maximization problem is almost exactly th~
same as the problem outlined in the first section.
The crucial difference is that benefits are being
spread over a smaller area, lowering the marginal
benefits function in proportion to the reduction.
In the previous section, it was seen that this
would have two effects, a reduction in the total
of acquired technology and a shift towards great-
er emphasis on transfered technology.
Differentiating with respect toa, one
obtains
If the interior solution does exist, we have
seen that the unirrigated portion of the region
will have less research and depend on transferred
research to a greater extent. This may have
serious consequences for inter-regional equity,
the more so if the irrigated portion competes
for resources with the unirrigated portion and is
perceived as having greater potential.
g (Z) is the research benefits function used
tRroughout the earlier discussion.
and
The second case allows for irrigation benefits
to be distributed over any area without increas-
ing marginal costs. In fact, it will be assumed
that the entire region is covered to the same
degree by the irrigation network, and that the
amount of the irrigation coverage in the region
is itself a choice variable. If water control is
thought of as a continuum from desert to com-
pletely and intensively irrigated, there can be
many gradations in the degree of water control
which can be introduced.
94While this result is suggestive, it is subject
to many caveats. Firstly, the currently observ-
ed range of relative costs may not be sufficient-
ly wide as to induce major substitution between
one approach and the others. More important are
the abstractions required to fit reality into
static models. Irrigation without additional re-
search would produce once and for all gains,
while research holds the promise of a stream of
improvements over time. As well irrigation may
improve research productivity by eliminating
drought resistance as a necessary component of
the research agenda, making other goals more
easily attainable. Finally, in most developing
countries the cost of research can be lowered
substantially in the long run by investing in
the training of native researchers and develop-
ing a viable indigenous research system. There
seemsless promise for the development of cheaper,
labor-intensive construction techniques. One
might wish, therefore, to use a lower relative
price of research than is actually observed.
Measurement and Testing
One can proceed to test whether the results
predicted by the model have real world counter-
parts. We saw that the nature of the 'appropri-
ate' technology would be such that:
(a) as the price of adaptive research rose
relative to independent research, there would be
more emphasis on independent research.
(b) as the scale increased, there would be
more emphasis on independent research.
(c) the degree of adaptation to the domestic
environment and the relative importance of inde-
pendent research would be positively correlated.
(d) as transferability increases, so would
the emphasis on adaptive research.
(e) as the technology available from different
regions increases, so would the dependence on
transfer.
One must find measures or proxies for the
levels of adaptive and applied research, the de-
gree of adaptation, the degree of transferabil-
ity, and the costs of domestic and applied re-
search. It is possible in many research programs
to obtain estimates of the numbers of foreign
varieties tested in the varioustrials as well as
the number of foreign parents used in breeding
programs. If there is no reason for foreign
material to be more costly in these types of
experiments, we can compute the costs of adaptive
research as the cost of the foreign material used
in breeding and varietal trails. It seems
reasonable also to assign the costs of more
fundamental research entirely to the domestic
portion of the program.
Let CT be the cost of the various trials
comparing varieties, CB be the cost of the
breeding program, and Cs be the cost of research
on fundamental agricultural science.
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Then if
a is the percentage of foreign varieties used
in trials
and S is the percentage of foreign parents
in the breeding program, we can set
and
to give us the amounts expended on adaptive and
indepdent research.
If (a) - (e) are correct, we could estimate a
regression equation
terms
where Rl is a measure of transferability of re-
search from other regions into the domestic re-
gion,
Zf/Z is the ratio of foreign research to
domestlc research,
Q is a measure of the scale of production
in the domestic region,
WS/WT is the cost of agricultural science
research relative to yield trials, and
WS/W
C
is :he cost of agricultural science
researcll relatlve to breeding research.
There is some looseness in the definition pro-
vided above in terms of applicability to situa-
tions with more than two regions. In the latter
case, both Rand Zf would have to be indeces of
transferability and foreign research activity.
The latter would have to be constructed with the
recognition that an increase in research in a
region with a high degree of transferability
will have a greater effect than a similar in-
crease in a region with a very different environ-
ment. Similarly, if, for some reason, transfer-
ability should shift, it makes some difference
if the shift occurs in a region with a tiny
research establishment or one with a larger
research endowment.
Some candidates for the two-location transfer-
ability measure are (a) the simple rank correla-
tion of yields of a set of varieties across two
locations and (b) the correlation of the location
by variety interaction effects of a set of
varieties across two locations. The first
measure has the disadvantage in that it may bedominated by varietal effects which have little
relation to the transferability of material be-
tween the two locations.
Whichever measure is selected, in computing
an index of overall transferability, some weigh-
ing scheme must be used. The best candidate is
some measure of research inputs in the region
producing the research for transfer. This could
be expenditures, scientist-years, publications
or some other suitable measure.
As we saw, the scale of operations itself
would affect the distribution of effort between
independent and adaptive research. Thus, the
total production of the region or the land area
should be used to represent the scale.
We also saw that the level of independent re-
search would increase with the degree of adapta-
tion of the technology to the environment.
If we let YF be the yield of varieties pro-
duced abroad and YD be the yield of varieties
produced independently, then we would expect
that YD YF would be positively correlated with
VZ/Vl. Moreover, one could expect that even the
varieties developed from crosses with foreign
varieties would be positively correlated with
VZ/Vl. This follows from the result obtained a-
bove that the research would tend to be more
adapted to the specific location as the importance
of independent research increased.
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